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I.	Theoretical	Derivations	
Best	response	entry	strategies	
Consider our citizen-candidate entry game without parties and with a discrete, uniform cumulative 
probability function of ideal points 𝐹ሺ𝑥ሻ ൌ 𝑥/100, 𝑥 ∈ ሼ1,2, … ,100ሽ and density 𝑓ሺ𝑥ሻ ൌ 1/100. If all 
citizens 𝑗 ് 𝑖 are using cutpoint strategy (cf. ሺ2ሻ in the main text) 
?̌?௝ ൌ ቊ
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑥௝ ∈ ሼ?ු?௟ ൅ 1, … , ?ු?௥ െ 1ሽ
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑥௝ ∈ ሼ1, … , ?ු?௟ሽ ∪ ሼ?ු?௥, … ,100ሽ,
                                              ሺ𝐴1ሻ 
then the expected payoff of a citizen type 𝑥௜ for entering the political competition, ?̌?௜ ൌ 1, is given by 
𝐸ሾ𝜋௜|𝑥௜, ?̌?௜ ൌ 1ሿ ൌ ሺ1 െ 𝑝ሻ௡ିଵ𝑏                                                                                                                             ሺ𝐴2ሻ
൅ ෍ ൬ 𝑛 െ 1𝑚 െ 1൰
௡
௠ୀଶ
𝑝௠ିଵሺ1 െ 𝑝ሻ௡ି௠ ൥ 𝑏𝑚 െ
𝑚 െ 1
𝑚 𝐸ሾ𝑣ሺ𝑥௜, 𝛾ሻ|𝛾 ∉ ሼ?ු?௟ ൅ 1, … , ?ු?௥ െ 1ሽሿ൩ െ 𝑐 
and her expected payoff from not	entering, ?̌?௜ ൌ 0, by 
𝐸ሾ𝜋௜|𝑥௜, ?̌?௜ ൌ 0ሿ ൌ ሺ1 െ 𝑝ሻ௡ିଵ ൥𝑏𝑛 െ
𝑛 െ 1
𝑛 𝐸ሾ𝑣ሺ𝑥௜, 𝑑ሻ|𝑑 ∈ ሼ?ු?௟ ൅ 1, … , ?ු?௥ െ 1ሽሿ൩                                     ሺ𝐴3ሻ
െ ෍ ൬ 𝑛 െ 1𝑚 െ 1൰
௡
௠ୀଶ
𝑝௠ିଵሺ1 െ 𝑝ሻ௡ି௠𝐸ሾ𝑣ሺ𝑥௜, 𝛾ሻ|𝛾 ∉ ሼ?ු?௟ ൅ 1, … , ?ු?௥ െ 1ሽሿ. 
The expected policy loss terms 𝐸ሾ𝑣ሺ𝑥௜, 𝑑ሻሿ and 𝐸ሾ𝑣ሺ𝑥௜, 𝛾ሻሿ are specified in ሺ4ሻ and ሺ5ሻ in the main 
text, respectively. Relating ሺ𝐴1ሻ and ሺ𝐴2ሻ and rearranging yields the best response entry strategy 
ሺ3ሻ in the main text. 
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With parties, if all citizens 𝑗 ് 𝑖 are using cutpoint strategy ሺ𝐴1ሻ, then the expected payoff of 
a citizen type 𝑥௜ in the Right	Party for entering the political competition, ?̌?௜ ൌ 1, is given by (and 
analogous for a citizen in the Left	Party) 
𝐸ሾ𝜋௜|𝑥௜, ?̌?௜ ൌ 1ሿ ൌ ሺ1 െ 𝑝ሻ௡ିଵ𝑏                                                                                                                             ሺ𝐴4ሻ 
         ൅ ෍ ൬ 𝑛 െ 1𝑚௥ െ 1൰
௡
௠ೝୀଶ
ቀ𝑝2ቁ
௠ೝିଵ ሺ1 െ 𝑝ሻ௡ି௠ೝ ൥ 𝑏𝑚௥ െ
𝑚௥ െ 1
𝑚௥ 𝐸ሾ𝑣ሺ𝑥௜, 𝛾ሻ|𝛾 ∈ ሼ?ු?௥, … ,100ሽሿ൩                
൅ ෍ ෍ ൬𝑛 െ 1𝑚௟ ൰
௡ି௠೗ିଵ
௞ୀ଴
௡ିଵ
௠೗ୀଵ
ቀ𝑝2ቁ
௠೗ ሺ1 െ 𝑝ሻ௡ି௠೗ିଵ ൬𝑛 െ 𝑚௟ െ 1𝑘 ൰ ൬
1
2൰
௡ି௠೗ିଵ
                                           
ൈ ൣ𝜌௥𝑏 െ ሺ1 െ 𝜌௥ሻ𝐸ሾ𝑣ሺ𝑥௜, 𝛾ሻ|𝛾 ∈ ሼ1, … , 𝑥௟ሽሿ൧ 
         ൅ ෍ ෍ ෍ ൬ 𝑛 െ 1𝑚௥ െ 1൰ ൬
𝑛 െ 𝑚௥
𝑚௟ ൰
௡ି௠
௞ୀ଴
௡ି௠ೝ
௠೗ୀଵ
௡ିଵ
௠ೝୀଶ
ቀ𝑝2ቁ
௠ೝିଵ ቀ𝑝2ቁ
௠೗
ሺ1 െ 𝑝ሻ௡ି௠ ቀ𝑛 െ 𝑚𝑘 ቁ ൬
1
2൰
௡ି௠
       
ൈ ቎െሺ1 െ 𝜌௥ሻ𝐸ሾ𝑣ሺ𝑥௜, 𝛾ሻ|𝛾 ∈ ሼ1, … , 𝑥௟ሽሿ ൅ 𝜌௥ ൥ 𝑏𝑚௥ െ
𝑚௥ െ 1
𝑚௥ 𝐸ሾ𝑣ሺ𝑥௜, 𝛾ሻ|𝛾 ∈ ሼ?ු?௥, … ,100ሽሿ൩቏ െ 𝑐 
and her expected payoff from not	entering, ?̌?௜ ൌ 0, is given by 
𝐸ሾ𝜋௜|𝑥௜, ?̌?௜ ൌ 0ሿ ൌ ሺ1 െ 𝑝ሻ௡ିଵ ൥𝑏𝑛 െ
𝑛 െ 1
𝑛 𝐸ሾ𝑣ሺ𝑥௜, 𝑑ሻ|𝑑 ∈ ሼ?ු?௟ ൅ 1, … , ?ු?௥ െ 1ሽሿ൩                             ሺ𝐴5ሻ 
         െ ෍ ൬ 𝑛 െ 1𝑚௥ െ 1൰
௡
௠ೝୀଶ
ቀ𝑝2ቁ
௠ೝିଵ ሺ1 െ 𝑝ሻ௡ି௠ೝ𝐸ሾ𝑣ሺ𝑥௜, 𝛾ሻ|𝛾 ∈ ሼ?ු?௥, … ,100ሽሿ                                             
         െ ෍ ൬𝑛 െ 1𝑚௟ ൰ ቀ
𝑝
2ቁ
௠೗ ሺ1 െ 𝑝ሻ௡ି௠೗ିଵ𝐸ሾ𝑣ሺ𝑥௜, 𝛾ሻ|𝛾 ∈ ሼ1, … , ?ු?௟ሽሿ
௡ିଵ
௠೗ୀଵ
                      
െ ෍ ෍ ෍ ൬ 𝑛 െ 1𝑚௥ െ 1൰ ൬
𝑛 െ 𝑚௥
𝑚௟ ൰
௡ି௠ିଵ
௞ୀ଴
௡ି௠ೝ
௠೗ୀଵ
௡ିଵ
௠ೝୀଶ
ቀ𝑝2ቁ
௠ೝିଵ ቀ𝑝2ቁ
௠೗
ሺ1 െ 𝑝ሻ௡ି௠ ቀ𝑛 െ 𝑚𝑘 ቁ ൬
1
2൰
௡ି௠
                          
ൈ ൣሺ1 െ 𝜌௥ሻ𝐸ሾ𝑣ሺ𝑥௜, 𝛾ሻ|𝛾 ∈ ሼ1, … , ?ු?௟ሽሿ ൅ 𝜌௥𝐸ሾ𝑣ሺ𝑥௜, 𝛾ሻ|𝛾 ∈ ሼ?ු?௥, … ,100ሽሿ൧.                             
The three expected policy loss terms 𝐸ሾ𝑣ሺ𝑥௜, . ሻሿ with parties are specified in ሺ7ሻ to ሺ9ሻ and the win 
probability of the Right	 Party, 𝜌௥, is described on p. 10 in the main text. Then, relating both 
conditions and rearranging yields the best response entry strategy ሺ6ሻ in the main text. 
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Average	expected	welfare	
Without parties, the ex-ante (i.e., before citizen ideal points are randomly drawn), the average or 
expected individual payoff 𝜋௘ ൌ భ೙ ∑ 𝜋௘,௜௡௜ୀଵ  is given by 
𝜋௘,ே௢ ௉௔௥௧௬ ൌ 𝐾 െ 𝑝𝑐 ൅ 𝑏𝑛 െ ሺ1 െ 𝑝ሻ
௡ 𝑛 െ 1
𝑛 ෍  ෍
|𝑥 െ 𝛾|
ሺ?ු?௥െ?ු?௟ െ 1ሻଶ
௫ුೝିଵ
ఊୀ௫ු೗ାଵ
௫ුೝିଵ
௫ୀ௫ු೗ାଵ
െ ෍ ቀ 𝑛𝑚ቁ
௡
௠ୀଵ
𝑝௠ሺ1 െ 𝑝ሻ௡ି௠ 
ൈ 1𝑛 ቎ሺ𝑛 െ 𝑚ሻ ෍  ෍
|𝑥 െ 𝛾|
ሺ?ු?௥െ?ු?௟ െ 1ሻ?ු?௟
௫ු೗
ఊୀଵ
௫ුೝିଵ
௫ୀ௫ු೗ାଵ
൅ ሺ𝑚 െ 1ሻ ∙ 12 ቌ෍  ෍
|𝑥 െ 𝛾|
ሺ?ු?௟ሻଶ
௫ු೗
ఊୀଵ
௫ු೗
௫ୀଵ
൅ ෍  ෍ |𝑥 െ 𝛾|ሺ?ු?௟ሻଶ
ଵ଴଴
ఊୀ௫ුೝ
௫ු೗
௫ୀଵ
ቍ቏   ሺ𝐴6ሻ 
and with parties it is given by 
𝜋௘,௉௔௥௧௬ ൌ 𝐾 െ 𝑠𝑐 ൅ 𝑏𝑛 െ ሺ1 െ 𝑝ሻ
௡ ∙ 𝑛 െ 1𝑛 ෍  ෍
|𝑥 െ 𝛾|
ሺ?ු?௥ െ ?ු?௟ െ 1ሻଶ
௫ුೝିଵ
ఊୀ௫ු೗ାଵ
௫ුೝିଵ
௫ୀ௫ු೗ାଵ
                                        ሺ𝐴7ሻ 
 െ2 ෍ ൬ 𝑛𝑚௟൰
௡
௠೗ୀଵ
ቀ𝑝2ቁ
௠೗ ሺ1 െ 𝑝ሻ௡ି௠೗ ∙ 1𝑛 ቎ሺ𝑛 െ 𝑚௟ሻ ෍  ෍
|𝑥 െ 𝛾|
ሺ?ු?௥ െ ?ු?௟ െ 1ሻ?ු?௟
௫ු೗
ఊୀଵ
௫ුೝିଵ
௫ୀ௫ු೗ାଵ
൅ ሺ𝑚௟ െ 1ሻ ෍  ෍
|𝑥 െ 𝛾|
ሺ?ු?௟ሻଶ
௫ු೗
ఊୀଵ
௫ු೗
௫ୀଵ
቏ 
െ ෍ ෍ ෍ ൬ 𝑛𝑚௟൰ ൬
𝑛 െ 𝑚௟
𝑚௥ ൰ ቀ
𝑝
2ቁ
௠೗ ቀ𝑝2ቁ
௠ೝ ሺ1 െ 𝑝ሻ௡ି௠ ቀ𝑛 െ 𝑚𝑘 ቁ ൬
1
2൰
௡ି௠௡ି௠
௞ୀ଴
௡ି௠೗
௠ೝୀଵ
௡ିଵ
௠೗ୀଵ
 
ൈ 1𝑛 ቎𝜌௟ ቌ𝑘 ෍  ෍
|𝑥 െ 𝛾|
ሺ50 െ ?ු?௟ሻ?ු?௟
௫ු೗
ఊୀଵ
ହ଴
௫ୀ௫ු೗ାଵ
൅ ሺ𝑛 െ 𝑚 െ 𝑘ሻ ෍  ෍ |𝑥 െ 𝛾|ሺ50 െ ?ු?௟ሻ?ු?௟
௫ු೗
ఊୀଵ
௫ුೝିଵ
௫ୀହଵ
൅ ሺ𝑚௟ െ 1ሻ ෍  ෍
|𝑥 െ 𝛾|
ሺ?ු?௟ሻଶ
௫ු೗
ఊୀଵ
௫ු೗
௫ୀଵ
 
      ൅𝑚௥ ෍  ෍
|𝑥 െ 𝛾|
ሺ?ු?௟ሻଶ
௫ු೗
ఊୀଵ
ଵ଴଴
௫ୀ௫ුೝ
ቍ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝜌௟ሻ ቌ𝑘 ෍  ෍
|𝑥 െ 𝛾|
ሺ50 െ ?ු?௟ሻ?ු?௟
ଵ଴଴
ఊୀ௫ුೝ
ହ଴
௫ୀ௫ු೗ାଵ
൅ ሺ𝑛 െ 𝑚 െ 𝑘ሻ ෍  ෍ |𝑥 െ 𝛾|ሺ50 െ ?ු?௟ሻ?ු?௟
ଵ଴଴
ఊୀ௫ුೝ
௫ුೝିଵ
௫ୀହଵ
 
      ൅𝑚௟ ෍  ෍
|𝑥 െ 𝛾|
ሺ?ු?௟ሻଶ
ଵ଴଴
ఊୀ௫ුೝ
௫ු೗
௫ୀଵ
൅ሺ𝑚௥ െ 1ሻ ෍  ෍
|𝑥 െ 𝛾|
ሺ?ු?௟ሻଶ
ଵ଴଴
ఊୀ௫ුೝ
ଵ଴଴
௫ୀ௫ුೝ
ቍ቏, 
where 𝜌௟ ൌ 𝐻 ቂ௠೗ା௞௡ െ
ଵ
ଶቃ is the Left	Party’s probability of winning and 𝐻ሾ𝑧ሿ ൌ ቐ
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑧 ൏ 0
1/2 𝑖𝑓 𝑧 ൌ 0
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑧 ൐ 0
. 
QRE	entry	conditions	
Here, we derive the logit QRE conditions of entry probabilities, allowing for erroneous binary 
decisions at each ideal point 𝑥 ∈ ሼ1,2, … 100ሽ. If 𝜆 ൌ 0, then each citizen type 𝑥 makes purely 
random decisions (i.e., enters with probability one-half). If 𝜆 ൎ ∞, then everyone follows the BNE 
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cutpoint strategy. Since there are one-hundred different citizen types 𝑥, we must simultaneously 
solve one-hundred conditions. Without parties, the QRE condition for a citizen type 𝑥௜ is given by 
𝑞௫೔ ൌ
1
1 ൅ 𝑒ିఒ௏ሺ௫೔,௤ሬ⃗ ೣሻ .                                                                  ሺ𝐴8ሻ 
The LHS gives her entry probability 𝑞௫೔ and on RHS ?⃗?௫ denotes the vector of entry probabilities of 
all feasible types 𝑥 ∈ ሼ1,2, … ,100ሽ that every other citizen 𝑗 ് 𝑖 may possess. Since ideal points are 
iid random draws from a uniform distribution, each 𝑥 occurs with probability 1/100 so the average 
entry probability of each other citizen 𝑗 is given by 
𝑞 ൌ 1100 ෍ 𝑞௫
ଵ଴଴
௫ୀଵ
.                                                                     ሺ𝐴9ሻ 
 Further, RHS contains citizen 𝑖’s expected net payoff from entering (cf. ሺ3ሻ in the main text), 
which is given by 
𝑉ሺ𝑥௜, ?⃗?௫ሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ 𝑞ሻ௡ିଵ ൬𝑛 െ 1𝑛 ൰ ൣ𝑏 ൅ 𝐸ሾ𝑣ሺ𝑥௜, 𝑑ሻ|𝑑 ∈ሼ1, … ,100ሽሿ൧                                                            ሺ𝐴10ሻ 
൅ ෍ ൬ 𝑛 െ 1𝑚 െ 1൰
௡
௠ୀଶ
𝑞௠ିଵሺ1 െ 𝑞ሻ௡ି௠ 1𝑚 ൣ𝑏 ൅ 𝐸ሾ𝑣ሺ𝑥௜, 𝛾ሻ|𝛾 ∈ ሼ1, … ,100ሽሿ൧ െ 𝑐,                      
with 
𝐸ሾ𝑣ሺ𝑥௜, 𝑑ሻ|𝑑 ∈ ሼ1, … ,100ሽሿ ൌ 11 െ 𝑞 ෍ሺ1 െ 𝑞௫ሻ
|𝑥௜ െ 𝑥|
100
ଵ଴଴
௫ୀଵ
                             ሺ𝐴11ሻ 
and 
𝐸ሾ𝑣ሺ𝑥௜, 𝛾ሻ|𝛾 ∈ ሼ1, … ,100ሽሿ ൌ 1𝑞 ෍ 𝑞௫
|𝑥௜ െ 𝑥|
100
ଵ଴଴
௫ୀଵ
,                                       ሺ𝐴12ሻ 
where the expected policy losses ሺ𝐴11ሻ and ሺ𝐴12ሻ account for all feasible ideal points of others (i.e., 
not just those of the more extreme entrants as dictated by the BNE cutpoint pair). 
Then, for a given 𝜆 the one-hundred equilibrium conditions of the form ሺ𝐴8ሻ are 
simultaneously solved for 𝑥 ൌ 1, … ,100  to determine the QRE vector of entry probabilities, ?⃗?௫ఒ. 
Next, with parties we need to distinguish between entrants from the Left and Right	Party, 
respectively, so we replace the average entry probability of each other citizen 𝑗 ሺ𝐴9ሻ by the 
probabilities that 𝑗 enters from the left or right direction, respectively: 
𝑞௟ ൌ 150 ෍ 𝑞௫                                                                       ሺ𝐴13ሻ
ହ଴
௫ୀଵ
 
and 
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𝑞௥ ൌ 150 ෍ 𝑞௫,
ଵ଴଴
௫ୀହଵ
                                                                     ሺ𝐴14ሻ 
where the average individual entry probability is 
𝑞 ൌ 𝑞௟ ൅ 𝑞௥.                                                                         ሺ𝐴15ሻ 
 The RHS of ሺ𝐴8ሻ contains citizen 𝑖’s expected net payoff from entering (cf. ሺ6ሻ in the main 
text), which for a right type 𝑥 ∈ ሼ51, … ,100ሽ  is given by (and similar for a left type 𝑥 ∈ ሼ1, … ,50ሽ) 
𝑉ሺ𝑥௜, ?⃗?௫ሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ 𝑞ሻ௡ିଵ ൬𝑛 െ 1𝑛 ൰ ൣ𝑏 ൅ 𝐸ሾ𝑣ሺ𝑥௜, 𝑑ሻ|𝑑 ∈ ሼ1, … ,100ሽሿ൧ ൅ 
൅ ෍ ൬ 𝑛 െ 1𝑚௥ െ 1൰
௡
௠ೝୀଶ
ሺ𝑞௥ሻ௠ೝିଵሺ1 െ 𝑞ሻ௡ି௠ೝ ∙ 1𝑚௥ ൣ𝑏 ൅ 𝐸ሾ𝑣ሺ𝑥௜, 𝛾ሻ|𝛾 ∈ ሼ51, … ,100ሽሿ൧                           ሺ𝐴16ሻ 
    ൅ ෍ ෍ ൬𝑛 െ 1𝑚௟ ൰
௡ି௠೗ିଵ
௞ୀ଴
௡ିଵ
௠೗ୀଵ
ሺ𝑞௟ሻ௠೗ሺ1 െ 𝑞ሻ௡ି௠೗ିଵ ൬𝑛 െ 𝑚௟ െ 1𝑘 ൰ ൬
1
2൰
௡ି௠೗ିଵ
ൈ 𝜌௥ൣ𝑏 ൅ 𝐸ሾ𝑣ሺ𝑥௜, 𝛾ሻ|𝛾 ∈ሼ1, … ,50ሽሿ൧ 
   ൅ ෍ ෍ ෍ ൬ 𝑛 െ 1𝑚௥ െ 1൰ ൬
𝑛 െ 𝑚௥
𝑚௟ ൰
௡ି௠ିଵ
௞ୀ଴
௡ି௠ೝ
௠೗ୀଵ
௡ିଵ
௠ೝୀଶ
ሺ𝑞௥ሻ௠ೝିଵሺ𝑞௟ሻ௠೗ሺ1 െ 𝑞ሻ௡ି௠ ቀ𝑛 െ 𝑚𝑘 ቁ ൬
1
2൰
௡ି௠
ൈ 𝜌௥𝑚௥ ൣ𝑏 ൅ 𝐸ሾ𝑣ሺ𝑥௜, 𝛾ሻ|𝛾 ∈ ሼ51, … ,100ሽሿ൧ െ 𝑐, 
with 
𝐸ሾ𝑣ሺ𝑥௜, 𝑑ሻ|𝑑 ∈ ሼ1, … ,100ሽሿሿ ൌ 11 െ 𝑞 ෍ሾ1 െ 𝑞௫ሿ
|𝑥௜ െ 𝑥|
100
ଵ଴଴
௫ୀଵ
,                                ሺ𝐴17ሻ 
𝐸ሾ𝑣ሺ𝑥௜, 𝛾ሻ|𝛾 ∈ ሼ51, … ,100ሽሿ ൌ 1𝑞௥ ෍ 𝑞௫
|𝑥௜ െ 𝑥|
50
ଵ଴଴
௫ୀହଵ
,                                      ሺ𝐴18ሻ 
and 
𝐸ሾ𝑣ሺ𝑥௜, 𝛾ሻ|𝛾 ∈ ሼ1, … ,50ሽሿ ൌ 1𝑞௟ ෍ 𝑞௫
ห𝑥௜ െ 𝑥௝ห
50
ଵ଴଴
௫ୀହଵ
                                       ሺ𝐴19ሻ 
where he expected policy losses ሺ𝐴17ሻ to ሺ𝐴18ሻ account for all feasible ideal points of others, and 
𝜌௥ ൌ 𝐻 ቂ௠ೝା௞௡ െ
ଵ
ଶቃ gives the win probability of the Right	Party with 𝐻ሾ𝑧ሿ ൌ ቐ
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑧 ൏ 0
1/2 𝑖𝑓 𝑧 ൌ 0
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑧 ൐ 0
. Then, 
for a given 𝜆 the one-hundred equilibrium conditions of the form ሺ𝐴8ሻ are simultaneously solved 
for 𝑥 ൌ 1, … ,100  to determine the QRE vector of entry probabilities, ?⃗?௫ఒ. 
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Figure	I.1: QRE distributions of entry probabilities - Example 
 
II.	Sample	Instructions	and decision screens 
Instructions	(Party, 𝑛 ൌ 4, 𝑐 ൌ 10)	
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this decision-making experiment. You will receive $7 for 
participating, plus additional earnings during the experiment that depend on your own decisions, 
the decisions of others, and chance. Your earnings in the experiment are expressed in points. 250 
points are worth $1. At the end of the experiment, your total earnings in points will be exchanged 
into dollars and paid to you in cash. No other participant will be informed about your payment! 
Please	 switch	 off	 your	 cellphone,	 remain	 quiet,	 and	 do	 not	 communicate	 with	 other	 participants	
during	the	entire	experiment! Raise your hand if you have any questions, and one of us will come to 
you to answer them. 
 
Parts	and	Decision	Rounds	
The experiment consists of two parts, labeled Part	1 and Part	2. Each part has 30	decision	rounds. 
We will read you the instructions for Part 1 now. After completing Part 1 we will read instructions 
for Part 2. 
Instructions	Part	1	
Your	Group	
At the beginning of each round, all participants will be randomly divided into groups	of	4. Thus, in 
addition to yourself, there will be three other members in your	group. Note that you will not know 
who these other members are. Also, please note that the groups are completely independent of each 
other. In any particular round you will have no interaction at all with participants in the other 
groups. 
 
Group	Decision	Problem	
In each round, your group will decide on a group	outcome, which can be any integer between 1 and 
100. This is done by electing a group	leader, whose best	outcome will be implemented as the group 
outcome. Each of you will be told what your own best outcome is in that round, and different group 
members will generally have different best outcomes. You receive the highest benefits if the group 
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outcome equals your own best outcome, and receive lower benefits the further the group outcome 
is from your own best outcome. We will explain the exact payoff details shortly. 
 
Random	Assignment	of	Best	Outcomes	
How is your own best outcome assigned in a round? This is done by the computer. It will randomly 
assign each member in your group a best outcome by choosing one of the integers from 1 to 100, 
with each integer being equally likely. The computer does this completely independently for each 
group member, so typically different members will each have a different best outcome. You are only 
told your own best outcome. You are not told the best outcome of any other group member. 
Therefore, knowing your own best outcome gives you no information whatsoever about anybody 
else’s best outcome. All you know about another group member’s best outcome is that it is some 
integer from 1 to 100, with an equal chance of being any of those integers. Importantly, best 
outcomes are reassigned independently in each round, so your own best outcome will typically 
vary from round to round, and your past assigned best outcomes have nothing to do with your 
future assigned best outcomes. 
Low	Number	and	High	Number	Members 
If your best outcome is 50 or less, then we refer to you as a “Low number” member. If your best 
outcome is 51 or greater, then we refer to you as a “High number” member. The same holds for the 
other members in your group. 
Decision‐Making	Stages	
Each round consists of two decision‐making	stages, labeled Stage	1 and Stage	2. 
Stage	1	
Each group member will decide on whether or not to enter as a candidate in the upcoming election 
for group leader of the current round. Whoever will become the group leader receives a bonus	of	5	
points. However, if you choose to enter as a candidate for leadership, then you must pay an entry	fee	
of	10	points. If you choose not to enter, then you do not pay any fee (0 points). The winner of the 
election will be the group leader, and the group outcome coincides with her or his best outcome. 
Stage	2	
In this stage, if more than one low number member entered in Stage 1, then the computer will 
randomly select one of them for the election with an equal chance for each. This selected member is 
called “Low Number Candidate.” Similarly, if more than one high number member entered in Stage 
1, then the computer will randomly select one of them for the election with an equal chance for 
each. This selected member is called “High Number Candidate.” Each group member casts a single 
vote for exactly one candidate. The candidates are indicated on the computer screen, represented 
by decision buttons labeled with their member ID label letter and whether they are from Low or 
High. For example, if member X and member Q are the respective low and high number candidates, 
then there will be two decision buttons with labels “Low Number Candidate X” and “High Number 
Candidate Q”, respectively. If no low (high) number member entered in Stage 1, then there is no low 
(high) number candidate. 
 
Each group member, whether a candidate or not, then votes for one of the candidates by clicking on 
the respective decision button, possibly for her- or himself. If you are a candidate yourself, then the 
label on your decision button is highlighted in red. The	candidate	with	the	most	votes	in	your	group	
is	the	elected	group	leader. If the candidates have the same number of votes, then one of them will 
be randomly selected as the group leader, with an equal chance for each. 
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Special case: If no group member entered as a candidate in Stage 1, then there is no voting. Instead, 
one of the four group members will be randomly selected as the group leader, with an equal chance 
for each. Please note that this randomly selected group leader does not pay the entry fee (because 
she or he actually did not enter) but nonetheless still receives the leader bonus of 5 points and the 
group outcome equals her or his best outcome. 
 
It is important to remember that the group outcome is always exactly equal to the best outcome of 
the group leader, regardless of whether she or he entered and won the election or was selected 
randomly after nobody entered. 
 
Your	Round	Earnings	
Your	round	earnings will depend on three factors: the distance between your own best outcome and 
the group outcome, whether you chose to enter the election as a candidate, and whether you are the 
group leader. There are only four possibilities: 
 
(i) You were a candidate but not elected to be group leader 
In this case, your round earnings equal “100 points minus the absolute distance between your own 
best outcome and the group outcome, minus the 10 points entry fee” or: 
𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 ሺ𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒, 𝑏𝑢𝑡 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟ሻ 
ൌ 100 െ |𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 െ 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒| െ 10. 
Example: Your own best outcome is 60, and the group outcome is 91, then your round earnings are 
100 െ |60 െ 91| െ 10 ൌ 59 points. 
(ii) You were a candidate and elected to be group leader 
In this case, your round earnings are equal to exactly 95 points, or: 
𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 ሺ𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟ሻ 
ൌ 100 െ |𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒 െ 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒| ൅ 5 െ 10 
ൌ 100 െ 0 ൅ 5 െ 10 ൌ 95. 
(iii) You were not a candidate and were not the group leader 
In this case, your round earnings equal “100 points minus the absolute distance between your own 
best outcome and the group outcome” or: 
𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 ሺ𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑟 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟ሻ 
ൌ 100 െ |𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 െ 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒|. 
Example: Your own best outcome is 60, and the group outcome is 15, then your round earnings are 
100 െ  |60 െ 15| ൌ 55 points. 
(iv) Nobody entered as a candidate and you were randomly selected to be group leader 
In this case, your round earnings are equal to exactly 105 points, or:  
𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 ሺ𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒, 𝑏𝑢𝑡 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟ሻ 
ൌ 100 െ |𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒 െ 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒| ൅ 5 
ൌ 100 െ 0 ൅ 5 ൌ 105. 
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Observe that if you are a candidate, your expected round payoff is highest if you vote for yourself. 
This is because in case you will be elected group leader, you receive the leader bonus of 5 points 
and avoid any losses in points from the absolute difference between your best outcome and the 
group outcome, as your best outcome will be the group outcome. 
Note that your	total	earnings in Part 1 are equal to the sum of all your round earnings in that part. 
 
Each of the 30 decision rounds in Part 1 will follow the rules just described. Remember that you are 
randomly re-matched into new 4-person groups and randomly reassigned your own best outcomes 
between each round. At the bottom of your computer screen there will be a full summary of the 
history of your experience and payoffs in all prior rounds. 
 
	
Decision	screens	(Party, 𝑛 ൌ 4, 𝑐 ൌ 10 points) 
Entry	decision	
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Voting	decision	
 
Election	results	
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Decision	screens	(No	Party, 𝑛 ൌ 10, 𝑐 ൌ 10 points) 
Entry	decision	
 
Voting	decision	
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Election	results	
  
 
III.	Data:	Tables	and	Figures	
Table	III.1: Entry rates - Predictions and data 
n	 c	 Party	 𝑝௢௕௦   𝑝∗ (𝑝௘௠௣∗ ) 𝑝ఒ෡ (𝑝௘௠௣ఒ෡ ) 
4 10 No .687 .840 (.844) .603 (.602) 
4 10 Yes .673 .680 (.671) .569 (.570) 
4 20 No .560 .400 (.417) .457 (.459) 
4 20 Yes .496 .340 (.364) .434 (.436) 
10 10 No .519 .420 (.426) .465 (.465) 
10 10 Yes .445 .280 (.256) .424 (.423) 
10 20 No .426 .200 (.181) .331 (.330) 
10 20 Yes .321 .160 (.152) .303 (.302) 
Note: 𝑛 and 𝑐 denote the electorate size and entry cost, respectively. 𝑝 denotes an individual’s (expected) 
entry rate, where superscript obs indicates observations, superscript * indicates BNE, and superscript 𝜆መ, the 
maximum likelihood estimate of the degree of error, indicates QRE. The subscript emp	refers to the empirical, 
or realized, distribution of ideal points as compared to the theoretical distribution. Standard errors of 𝑝௢௕௦ 
are all in the range ሾ.013, .016ሿ.  
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Table	III.2: Average payoffs – Predictions and data  
n	 c	 Party	 𝜋ത ௢௕௦	 				𝜋௘∗    (𝜋௘௠௣∗ )       𝜋௘ఒ෡    (𝜋௘௠௣ఒ෡ )	
4 10 No 69.26 66.98 (67.00) 69.91 (70.67) 
4 10 Yes 70.42 69.09 (69.06) 71.96 (72.14) 
4 20 No 64.22 64.59 (64.00) 66.65 (66.95) 
4 20 Yes 68.03 66.69 (66.56) 68.41 (68.73) 
10 10 No 64.44 59.71 (60.28) 65.45 (65.01) 
10 10 Yes 68.31 61.24 (63.98) 68.36 (68.31) 
10 20 No 62.61 57.59 (59.25) 63.20 (63.24) 
10 20 Yes 64.35 59.90 (61.89) 65.94 (65.91) 
Note: 𝑛 and 𝑐 denote the electorate size and entry cost, respectively. 𝜋 denotes an individual’s (expected) 
payoff, where superscript obs indicates observations, superscript * indicates BNE, and superscript 𝜆መ, the 
maximum likelihood estimate of the degree of error, indicates QRE. The subscript emp	refers to the empirical, 
or realized, distribution of ideal points as compared to the theoretical distribution.  Standard errors for 𝜋ത ௢௕௦ 
are in the range ሾ.71, .82ሿ. 
 
 
Table	III.3: Average payoffs, policy losses, and entry expenses – Predictions and data  
Treatment Payoffs Policy losses Entry expenses Bonus 
n	 c	 Party	 𝜋ത ௢௕௦	 𝜋ത௘௠௣∗  𝜋ത௘௠௣ఒ෡ 	 ?̅?௢௕௦ ?̅?௘௠௣∗  ?̅?௘௠௣ఒ෡  𝑝௢௕௦𝑐 𝑝௘௠௣∗ 𝑐 𝑝௘௠௣ఒ෡ 𝑐	 𝑏/𝑛	
4 10 No 69.26 67.00 70.67 25.12 25.81 24.55 6.87 8.44 6.02 1.25 
4 10 Yes 70.42 69.06 72.14 24.10 25.48 23.41 6.73 6.71 5.70 1.25 
4 20 No 64.22 64.00 66.95 25.83 28.91 25.12 11.20 8.33 9.18 1.25 
4 20 Yes 68.03 66.56 68.73 23.30 27.42 23.81 9.92 7.27 8.71 1.25 
10 10 No 64.44 60.28 65.01 30.87 35.96 30.84 5.19   4.26 4.65 0.50 
10 10 Yes 68.31 63.98 68.31 27.74 33.96 27.96 4.45 2.56 4.23 0.50 
10 20 No 62.61 59.25 63.24 29.38 37.63 30.66 8.52 3.62 6.60 0.50 
10 20 Yes 64.35 61.89 65.91 29.74 35.58 28.56 6.42 3.03 6.04 0.50 
Note: 𝑛 and 𝑐 denote the electorate size and entry cost, respectively. 𝑝, 𝜋ത, and ?̅?, denote an individual’s 
expected or average entry rate, payoff, and payoff loss, respectively. Superscript obs indicates observations, 
superscript * indicates BNE, and superscript 𝜆መ, the maximum likelihood estimate of the degree of error, 
indicates QRE. The subscript emp refers to the empirical, or realized, distribution of ideal points as compared 
to the theoretical distribution. Standard errors for 𝜋ത ௢௕௦ are in the range ሾ.71, .82ሿ, and for ?̅?௢௕௦ and 𝑝௢௕௦𝑐 they 
are in the range ሾ.69, .80ሿ and ሾ.13, .34ሿ, respectively. 
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Table	III.4: Observed average payoffs, policy losses, and entry expenses of leaders and non-
leaders 
Leader	 n	 c	 Party	 𝜋ത ௢௕௦	 ?̅?௢௕௦ 𝑝௢௕௦𝑐	 𝑏 
No 
4 10 No 60.65 33.49 5.86 - 
4 10 Yes 62.23 32.13 5.64 - 
4 20 No 57.19 34.44 8.37 - 
4 20 Yes 61.88 31.07 7.06 - 
10 10 No 61.04 34.30 4.66   - 
10 10 Yes 65.34 30.82 3.84 - 
10 20 No 60.12 32.64 7.24 - 
10 20 Yes 62.00 33.04 4.96 - 
Yes 
4 10 No 95.11 0 9.89 5 
4 10 Yes 95.00 0 10.00 5 
4 20 No 85.30 0 19.70 5 
4 20 Yes 86.50 0 18.50 5 
10 10 No 95.00 0 10.00   5 
10 10 Yes 95.08 0 9.92 5 
10 20 No 85.00 0 20.00 5 
10 20 Yes 85.50 0 19.50 5 
Note: 𝑛 and 𝑐 denote the electorate size and entry cost, respectively.  𝑝, 𝜋ത, and ?̅?, denote an individual’s entry 
rate, average payoff, and average payoff loss, respectively. obs indicates observations. For non-leaders, 
standard errors of 𝜋ത ௢௕௦, ?̅?௢௕௦, and 𝑝௢௕௦𝑐 are in the range ሾ. 74, .98ሿ, ሾ. 70, .89ሿ, and ሾ.15, .36ሿ, respectively. For 
leaders, standard errors of 𝜋ത ௢௕௦ and 𝑝௢௕௦𝑐 are both in the range ሾ.00, .34ሿ. 
 
Table	III.5: Random-effects logit regressions - Entry and distance from median per 
treatment combination 
n	 c	 Party	 Constant ห𝑥௜,௧ െ 𝑥௠௘ௗ௜௔௡ห49  
Block	of	15	periods	
(1	if	2nd) 
4 10 No     0.801*     (.424) 1.379*** (.295)   0.049 (.165) 
4 10 Yes      0.283       (.315)  1.377*** (.271)   0.200 (.159) 
4 20 No    -0.404      (.363) 1.859*** (.278)   0.089 (.152) 
4 20 Yes    -1.176*** (.484) 2.187*** (.277)  0.091 (.157) 
10 10 No    -0.525*     (.235) 1.172*** (.227) -0.096 (.131) 
10 10 Yes    -0.710**   (.265) 0.894*** (.234) -0.024 (.134) 
10 20 No    -0.521*     (.232) 0.704*** (.231)    -0.395** (.131) 
10 20 Yes    -1.545*** (.289) 1.235*** (.258)  -0.188 (.144) 
Note: 𝑛 and 𝑐 denote the electorate size and entry cost, respectively. * (**; ***) indicates a one-tailed 5% (1%, 
0.1%) significance level. The data is clustered at the indvidual level. 
 
 
 
14 
 
Table	III.6: Random-effects OLS regressions – Payoff and distance from median per 
treatment combination 
n	 c	 Party	 Constant ห𝑥௜,௧ െ 𝑥௠௘ௗ௜௔௡ห49  
Block	of	15	periods	
(1	if	2nd) 
4 10 No    74.76***   (1.75)    -9.70*** (2.73) -1.29 (1.59) 
4 10 Yes     73.08***   (1.80)    -6.75**   (2.71)   1.40 (1.64) 
4 20 No    72.88***   (1.73) -15.71*** (2.62) -1.31 (1.55) 
4 20 Yes    72.73***   (1.80)    -7.08** (2.70) -2.28 (1.62) 
10 10 No    73.82***   (1.62)  -19.65*** (2.45)   0.79 (1.45) 
10 10 Yes    78.31***   (1.59)  -18.98*** (2.37) -1.41 (1.38) 
10 20 No    69.79***   (1.57)  -16.28*** (2.44)   1.78 (1.40) 
10 20 Yes    71.68***   (1.71)  -16.34*** (2.54)   1.50 (1.46) 
Note: 𝑛 and 𝑐 denote the electorate size and entry cost, respectively. * (**; ***) indicates a one-tailed 5% (1%, 
0.1%) significance level. The data is clustered at the indvidual level. 
 
 
 
Figure	III.1: Entry rates per ideal points for normalized distances to median ideal point – 
Predictions and data 
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Figure	III.2: Frequency of participants with ideal points ሼ51, … ,100ሽ 
 
Figure	III.3: Cumulative frequency distributions of average individual entry rates 
 
 	
	
	
17 
 
Figure	III.4: Cumulative frequency distributions of estimated individual cutpoint pairs 
 
  
IV.	Additional	analysis	of	individual	voting	behavior 
Figure IV.1 displays the distribution of the number of unexpected votes across all participants, with 
the number of such votes on the horizontal axis (from zero to the maximum observed of eighteen) 
and the respective fraction of individuals on the vertical axis. The figure also separates out the 
observations for independent candidates, nominees, and non-nominees as they face different 
decision tasks. i The diagonal axis shows combinations of party mode and group size, with data 
pooled for both entry costs. The figure indicates that only very few participants voted unexpectedly. 
Specifically, 77.8 and 82.5 percent of the independent candidates in 4- and 10-person groups 
always voted as predicted, and these numbers are 87.5 and 100 percent for nominees and 71.9 and 
57.5 percent for non-nominees, respectively. And of the participants who cast at least one 
                                                            
i Compared to nominees in Party, there can be more than two contenders to choose from by candidates in No	Party, 
including themselves. And, non-nominees in Party must realize that their expected payoff is greater if they vote for the 
contender whose ideal point is from the same direction as the own one, while nominees simply vote for themselves. 
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anomalous vote, many did so just once or little more than this. Hence, the few deviations from 
equilibrium voting are due to the behavior of only a handful of the participants in the experiment. 
For example, the three largest individual counts of unexpected votes are seventeen by a candidate 
in ሺ𝑁𝑜 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦, 𝑛 ൌ 4ሻ and thirteen and eighteen by two non-nominees in ሺ𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦, 𝑛 ൌ 10ሻ, where the 
latter of them never entered. 
Figure	IV.1: Number of unexpected votes per individual 
 
Note: The fractions are shown per independent candidates, nominees, and non-nominees and are pooled for 
both entry cost treatments, so the figure connects only the party mode and group size. 
We also examine whether the observed rates of unexpected voting depend on the ideal 
point. ii Figure IV-2 shows the rates on the vertical axis and the absolute distance in the own ideal 
point and the closer “median” ideal point, 50 or 51, on the horizontal axis. Thus, at zero on the 
horizontal axis both ideal points coincide and at 49 the distance between them is maximal. The 
figure shows the data (lines with spikes) and respective logarithmic trend lines for candidates and 
nominees combined and for non-nominees (thick black and gray lines, respectively), and also 
separate logarithmic trends for candidates and nominees (dashed black lines) and non-nominees 
who did and did not enter (dashed gray lines). We find that unexpected voting of candidates and 
nominees doesn’t depend on the own ideal point, as measured by the absolute distance in the own 
and median ideal points (Spearman’s 𝜌 ൌ െ0.018 for both roles combined and െ0.037 and 0.034 
                                                            
ii The following analysis pools all data and utilizes only participants who cast at least one unexpected vote in the entire 
session. Using instead all participants in the nonparametric tests yields many ties and decreases the p-values, except for 
two increases where the results are statistically significant whether or not all individuals are considered. 
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for each role, respectively; 𝑝 ൒ 0.799), and is higher for candidates (but the difference is not 
significant, 𝑝 ൌ 0.115, individual level one-tailed Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, fifteen and four 
participants per role). 
Figure	IV.2: Unexpected voting per absolute distance in own and median ideal points 
 
Note: The figure depicts unexpected voting rates per absolute distance in own and median ideal points for 
non-nominees and for candidates and nominees combined. At zero, the own ideal point is 50 or 51, and at 49 
(50 െ 1 or 100 െ 51) the distance is maximal. The dashed lines show the respective logarithmic trends. 
By contrast, we observe a negative association between unexpected voting and the absolute 
distance in the own and median ideal points for non-nominees (𝜌 ൌ െ0.424 overall, and െ0.363 
and െ0.352 for entrants and non-entrants; 𝑝 ൑ 0.012). In Party, note that anomalous voting of non-
nominees tends to be smaller when they entered (𝑝 ൌ 0.006, one-tailed Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, 
25 individuals) and especially high for ideal points within about ten points of the median (see 
Figure IV.2). Also, the rates are always greater in the non-nominee than nominee role (𝑝 ൌ 0.003, 
same test, 26 individuals). Overall, our results indicate that among those who vote unexpectedly, 
candidates and nominees make “plain” errors while for non-nominees models that incorporate the 
pecuniary consequences of erroneous voting and beliefs about nominee ideal points seem more 
suitable.iii This also makes sense, since the expected payoff-maximizing vote is more obvious for 
                                                            
iii For example, QRE (McKelvey and Palfrey 1995, 1998) allows for decision-making errors and thus unexpected voting. It 
also predicts that such votes get more frequent the nearer an ideal point is to 50 or 51, as the expected policy loss if 
someone else is elected decreases towards the median. 
iv Table 6 in the paper suggests two more patterns of average individual rates of unexpected voting for primary 
comparisons. First, the rates are always weakly greater with a lower than larger entry cost for candidates and nominees 
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candidates and nominees than for non-nominees, which is also supported by learning towards BNE 
voting of participants in the latter role: while unexpected voting doesn’t depend on the period for 
candidates and nominees combined using all 60 periods or the first and last 30 periods only 
(Spearman’s 𝜌 ൌ െ0.112, െ0.247, and െ0.029; 𝑝 ൒ 0.188), it does so negatively for non-nominees 
for all 60 and last 30 periods (𝜌 ൌ െ0.312 and െ0.378; 𝑝 ൌ 0.093 and 0.003, respectively) but not 
the first 30 periods (𝜌 ൌ െ0.159, 𝑝 ൌ 0.402).iv 
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(𝑝 ൌ 0.035, one-tailed Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for both roles combined, eighteen individuals), but no pattern is seen 
for non-nominees (albeit, 𝑝 ൌ 0.074 in favor of greater rates with a lower cost, same test, 26 individuals). Second, the 
rates are always greater in smaller than larger groups for candidates and nominees (𝑝 ൌ 0.029, one-tailed Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test, twelve and seven individuals in 4- and 10-person groups, respectively), and the reverse is seen for 
non-nominees (but the difference is not significant, 𝑝 ൌ 0.241, same test, nine and seventeen individuals). Finally, for the 
two possible within-subject comparisons, unexpected voting is neither associated between both entry costs for 
candidates and nominees combined and for non-nominees nor between the nominee and non-nominee roles in Party 
(Spearman’s 𝜌 ൌ െ0.026, 0.105, and 0.058; 𝑝 ൒ 0.611). Due to few unexpected votes by few individuals, all these findings 
are hard to interpret as we would need to control for, say, ideal points and expected payoffs. 
